



























































   




Working Paper No. 0713 
July 2007 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz
Department of Economics 
Altenberger Strasse 69 
A-4040 Linz - Auhof, Austria 
www.econ.jku.at 
 
D DE EP PA AR RT TM ME EN NT T   O OF F   E EC CO ON NO OM MI IC CS S
J JO OH HA AN NN NE ES S   K KE EP PL LE ER R   U UN NI IV VE ER RS SI IT TY Y   O OF F




We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in
their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’
dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each
spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional
setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome this socially ineﬃcient
situation. This model is estimated and tested with rich micro-data from court
records. Employing a multiple treatment matching procedure we estimate the
causal eﬀect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property, on the length
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A central role of the legal system is dispute resolution. If parties do not resolve a
dispute by themselves, the legal system provides diﬀerent mechanisms for conﬂict
resolution.1 In each case parties have an incentive to devote resources either to gain
at the expense of the other or to avoid exploitation by the opposition. The result
of these contentious moves is typically a less eﬃcient outcome than if litigants had
managed to cooperate. A common attempt to try/avoid exploitation is hiring an
expert agent, namely a lawyer. One could argue in favor of the participation of
lawyers in dispute resolution if lawyers make negotiations more rational, minimize
the number of disputes, ensure that the outcomes reﬂect applicable norms and may
even discover pareto-superior agreements with which litigants would not have came
up without legal assistance. But the predominant contemporary view is that the
involvement of lawyers prolongs and aggravates conﬂicts.2
A common example of a dispute is a divorce process. After the breakdown of marriage
spouses have to divide their matrimonial property comprising tangible and intangible
assets (Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977; Weiss and Willis, 1997). Divorce law
typically necessitates a speciﬁed division of matrimonial property in order to dissolve
marriage legally. This is aggravated by the desire of each spouse to obtain a large
share as possible. Many observers are especially critical of the way lawyers behave in
divorce processes (Gilson and Mnookin, 1994). Indeed, lawyers face some incentives
to adopt negotiating strategies involving threats and conscious misrepresentations
of their clients’ true preferences in order to maximize their proﬁt. Lawyers may
make divorce processes more adversarial and painful than necessary. The presence
of lawyers frequently makes it more diﬃcult and costly for spouses to reach an
agreement on the division of matrimonial property. The policy question arises to
what extend should the state permit and encourage divorcing couples to take legal
assistance.3
In order to answer this question we formulate a simply model where divorcing spouses
can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. The beneﬁt of hiring lawyers is
captured by their ability to aﬀect the division of matrimonial property. It is obvious
that spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite
the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has a clear
incentive to hire a lawyer. In fact, if the expected beneﬁts from hiring a lawyer
1One typically distinguishes between conventional judicial dispute resolution (Cooter and Ru-
binfeld, 1989) and extrajudicial processes, so-called alternative dispute resolution (Shavell, 1995).
An example of the latter – which has been heavily studied in the economic literature on trade unions
– is arbitration (Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984; Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber and Spiegel, 1992). See
also Casella (1996) for a discussion of arbitration in international trade.
2Cutler and Summers (1999) demonstrate that the legal dispute between Texaco and Pennzoil
reduced the combined equity value of the two companies by over 30 percent. After settlement only
a large fraction of the losses in combined value was restored. As one possible cause of these large
ﬂuctuations in joint value the authors discuss the fees that both companies paid to their hosts of
lawyers. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) provide evidence that the ratio of college enrollments
in law to total college enrollments is inversely related to a country’s growth.
3In fact, we are not aware of any state that prohibits the use of lawyers in a divorce process.
Contrary, there are at least some countries where divorcing spouses are (partly) forced to hire a
lawyer. See Table 2 (column 1) in the Appendix.
2outweigh the associated cost retaining a lawyer is a dominant strategy.4 Although
this result is straightforward we represent it formally, since we propose in a next step
an institutional setting to overcome this socially ineﬃcient situation. It turns out,
that allowing for joint lawyers enables a second-best solution.5
In the empirical part of the paper the model is estimated and tested with rich micro-
data from court records. The primary aim of our empirical analysis is to assess
whether the involvement of lawyers in a divorce process has a causal eﬀect on the
divorce settlement. We use four diﬀerent outcome variables to characterize the con-
sequences of the involvement of lawyers. To capture the division of matrimonial
property we employ two outcome measures: (i) the alimony award to the wife and
(ii) the child-support award for the oldest minor. It turns out that in general there
is no causal eﬀect of the involvement of lawyers on the division of matrimonial prop-
erty. Just in the one case where only the wife has retained a lawyer she obtains a
higher share of matrimonial property compared to the situation without any lawyer.
Our third outcome measure is the length of the divorce process which should capture
additional monetary and psychic cost. Our fourth and ﬁnal outcome measure, the
number of subsequent trials, is a proxy for the quality of the divorce settlement in
terms of sustainability over time. We ﬁnd that in most of the cases lawyers un-
necessarily prolong the divorce process and cause an excess burden which increases
both the private and public cost of divorce. Since there exists also no beneﬁt of the
engagement of lawyers in terms of more sustainable divorce settlements over time,
we suggest to tune the institutional setting in order to minimize the engagement of
lawyers in divorce processes.
2 Theoretical considerations
Consider a couple who have decided to divorce. The spouses have already ﬁxed a
hearing at court. The prerequisite for divorce is that the spouses agree upon division
of matrimonial property. We presume that each spouse seeks to get the largest
possible share of the matrimonial property. If they cannot ﬁnd an agreement a judge
is used to resolve this dispute.6 That means, the judge decides upon the division of
matrimonial property. We deﬁne the judge’s preferred award af ∈ [0,1] as a share
of the matrimonial property awarded to the wife. Therefore, the husband receives
1 − af. Spouses are free to hire a lawyer. However, neither spouse knows for sure
what choice the other will make. The rationale behind hiring a lawyer is that a
lawyer may alter the judge’s decision in ones favor. We therefore presume that the
beneﬁt of legal representation is exclusively given by the lawyer’s ability to increase
the share of matrimonial property allocated to his client. Hence, we reduce a lawyer
to his role as negotiator and litigator. He has the responsibility for marshaling and
presenting relevant evidence and making the necessary legal arguments. While we
4This result was ﬁrst brought forward by Ashenfelter and Bloom (1990) and is discussed in the
context of arbitration more elaborately by Ashenfelter and Dahl (2003).
5In some countries the possibility of joint lawyers is indeed available. See Table 2 (column 2) in
the Appendix.
6Although this model is framed in the context of a court system it could equally as well be
applied to any (alternative) dispute resolution system such as ﬁnal oﬀer arbitration.
3think that this is the fundamental aspect of legal representation, we concede that a
client may proﬁt from his lawyer in further ways.7
2.1 Regime I - Separate lawyers only
As a ﬁrst step we presume an institutional setting where spouses are free to engage a
lawyer each. Thereby, we allow for the possibility that the spouses’ lawyers may diﬀer
in their ability of shifting the award of a male or a female spouse. If the wife hires
a lawyer it increases the award af by the quantity lw ∈ [0,1 − af]. The husband’s
lawyer reduces the award af by the quantity lh < af. The restrictions on lw and
lh simply guarantee that no spouse may receive more than the whole matrimonial
property. For the moment we assume that the quantities lw and lh are irrespective
of the usage of the lawyer of the other spouse. We will relax this assumption below.8
The lawyers’ fees are expressed as a fraction of the matrimonial property, where cw
and ch are the cost for hiring a lawyer for the wife and the husband respectively. We
therefore assume that the market for lawyers oﬀers two standardized services (lw, lh)




NLw 0,0 −lh,lh − ch
Lw lw − cw,−lw lw − cw − lh,lh − ch − lw
Figure 1: Regime I.
Assuming that the husband does not employ a lawyer, the expected net gain for the
wife from employing a lawyer is equal to lw − cw. Equivalently, if only the husband
hires a lawyer his net gain amounts to lh −ch. In the case where both spouses retain
a lawyer the net-eﬀect of the lawyers is unclear. If the lawyers have equal abilities
7It is typically necessary to follow certain legal procedures and complete various forms in order
to secure a divorce. A lawyer can take over these tasks and relieve his client. Moreover, a lawyer
may act as a counselor and help his client to determine his real interests. In addition, he can simple
provide moral support. For a further discussion of the several functions of a lawyer in a divorce
process refer to Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979).
8Another possibility is to model the award af as being drawn from a normal probability density
function with mean µ and variance σ




. One may think of judges being statistically
exchangeable and the distribution can be viewed as the distribution of preferred awards for a large
sample of judges who execute all the same case. This would introduce some uncertainty and the
lawyers would aﬀect the distribution, e.g. a shift in the mean. However, this would provide no
additional insights.
9Of course this is a very simplifying assumption. Instead one could introduce continuous strate-
gies Si = [0,∞), in which case a strategy si is the amount of money spent for the lawyer’s services
and the eﬀort/quality of a lawyer increases in si but at a decreasing rate, i.e. l
′
i(si) > 0 and
l
′′
i (si) < 0. However, this more realistic set-up does not change the basic result. Moreover, if
there is asymmetric information between lawyer and client the divorce process is characterized by
a further dimension of strategic interaction. We will discuss this issue in Section 2.3.
4to shift the award, lw = lh, the eﬀects of the lawyers cancel out and the wife’s net
gain amounts to −cw and the husband’s to −cl. However, if lw  = lh the net gains
are determined by the lawyers’ relative abilities to shift the award.10 The game is
illustrated by the bi-matrix in Figure 1 where each spouse i (i = w,h) has the choice
between hiring a lawyer (Li) or not (NLi). The payoﬀs are expressed relative to
the case where neither party hires a lawyer and the payoﬀs in this latter case are
normalized to zero. The ﬁrst entry represents the wife’s payoﬀ and the second entry
the husband’s payoﬀ.
Figure1 reveals that if lw > cw it pays for the wife to retain a lawyer regardless of
what the husband does. If the husband does not retain a lawyer, the wife receives
lw − cw, which is greater than 0. Likewise, if the husband does retain a lawyer, the
wife is certainly better oﬀ doing the same. In sum, the wife is better oﬀ employing a
lawyer regardless of what the husband does. An equivalent reasoning applies to the
husband’s choices. Therefore, if the following condition its satisﬁed,
li > ci i = w,h (1)
it pays for either spouse to retain a lawyer regardless of what the other does and the
actions (Lw,Lh) constitute a Nash equilibrium. In other words, if the expected gain
is higher than the cost, retaining a lawyer is a dominant strategy and the spouses
may face incentives to hire lawyers even if, in equilibrium, they do not improve their
payoﬀs. Of course, our framework enables us to explain situations where neither
spouse or only one spouse may hire a lawyer. For instance, the gain of hiring a lawyer
may simple not outweigh the cost for individual spouses. It is even conceivable that
the institutional setting implies that lw  = lh and e.g. women’s lawyers may face
a systematic higher potential to shift the award. In any case if lawyers are paid
according to their productivity, i.e. li = ci, hiring a lawyer is a weakly dominant
strategy.
Until now we presumed that the eﬀect of a lawyer was independent from the existence
of another lawyer in the courtroom. We now allow for the possibility that the lawyer’s
ability to aﬀect the award varies with the other spouse’s hiring decision. Suppose
that the wife’s award is increased by her lawyer by ¯ lw if the husband has no lawyer
and otherwise by lw where ¯ lw −lw ≡ εw > 0. The respective quantities for the eﬀect
of the husband’s lawyer are ¯ lh and lh where ¯ lh − lh ≡ εh > 0. We refer to this as
conditional lawyers’ eﬀects. We are now interested in the respective abilities of the
lawyers to shift the award. Therefore, we deﬁne si = li − lj where i  = j. To which
we refer as direct superiority capturing the case of a direct confrontation of the two
spouses’ lawyers in the courtroom. If si > 0 the lawyer of spouse i is able to shift
the award further than spouse’s j lawyer. We refer to this situation as the direct
superiority of lawyer i over the lawyer of spouse j. As a matter of course we denote
the case of si < 0 as the direct superiority of lawyer j.11
10The encounter of two lawyers in the courtroom introduces a third potential dimension of strate-
gic interaction in the divorce process (see Section 2.3).
11Equivalently, we can deﬁne for the comparison of the two cases where only one spouse retains
a lawyer the hypothetical indirect superiority given by ¯ si = ¯ li −¯ lj where i  = j. If ¯ si > 0 the lawyer
of spouse i is able to exploit the absence of lawyer j more eﬃciently than the lawyer of spouse j
can do, and vice versa.
5The modiﬁed bi-matrix in the case of conditional lawyers’ eﬀects is depicted in Figure
2. Again, we have expressed the payoﬀs relative to the case where neither spouse




NL 0,0 −¯ lh,¯ lh − ch
L ¯ lw − cw,−¯ lw sw − cw,−sw − ch
Figure 2: Regime I with conditional lawyers’ eﬀects.
Now, the actions (Lw,Lh) constitute a Nash equilibrium if the following condition is
satisﬁed
¯ li > ci and li > ci − εj ∀i  = j,i = w,h. (2)
Therefore, hiring a lawyer is a dominant strategy if (i) in the case where the other
spouse has no lawyer the beneﬁts of hiring a lawyer outweigh the associated cost
and (ii) if in the case where the other spouse has hired a lawyer too, the beneﬁts
outweigh the cost minus the others lawyer potential ability to exploit the absence of
one’s own lawyer. Note, in the case where i’s lawyer’s ability to exploit the absence
of a further lawyer is superior to j’s lawyer’s equivalent ability (εi > εj) the ﬁrst
condition is suﬃcient and hiring a lawyer is a dominant strategy for spouse i as long
as ¯ li > ci. Whereas in the case of εi < εj the condition li > ci − εj is suﬃcient.12
To sum up, an institutional setting oﬀering spouses the possibility to retain a lawyer
each embodies incentives associated with the prisoner’s dilemma if the individual
gain from engaging in noncooperative behavior is likely to exceed the cost. Given
that, each spouse employs a lawyer in the hope of exploiting the other. At the same
time both are aware that failing to do so will give the other the possibility to exploit
oneself. Both spouses retain a lawyer and pay a lawyer’s fee, but the award may be
precisely the same as would have occurred if neither spouse had hired a lawyer. The
individual demand for a lawyer in the divorce process is (at least) from the spouses’
point of view ineﬃcient.13 In the next section we propose a reform of Regime I
which should result in a more eﬃcient situation. By allowing spouses to employ a
joint lawyer a second best solution may be achievable.
12One can state these conditions in terms of superiority too: The actions (Lw,Lh) constitute a
Nash equilibrium if the ¯ li > ci and si > ci−¯ lj ∀i  = j,i = w,h. If the indirect superiority of lawyer
i is greater then his direct superiority (¯ si > si) the condition ¯ li > ci is suﬃcient to guarantee that
hiring a lawyer is a dominant strategy for spouse i. While, if the direct superiority of lawyer i is
greater then his indirect superiority (si > ¯ si) the condition si > ci − ¯ lj is suﬃcient.
13Of course, in sum this results just in a redistribution from the divorcing spouses to lawyers and
for the economy as a whole no ineﬃciencies arise.
62.2 Regime II - Allowing for a joint lawyer
Let us now consider an institutional setting which allows couples to hire a joint
lawyer. A joint lawyer is supposed to work simultaneously for both parties and may
therefore seem to be a non-intuitive concept at ﬁrst view. But as already mentioned
there a couple of countries where lawyers are allowed to represent the interests of
both husband and wife. In practice, a joint lawyer consults with the clients and they
work out together the terms of an agreement. Consequently, a joint lawyer is only
possible for no-fault divorces. However, since the principal of marital breakdown has
overridden the principle of fault throughout the Western world (Boele-Woelki, Braat
and Sumner, 2005) Regime II is indeed a highly relevant option.14 In any case it has
to be guaranteed that in a case of a conﬂict of interests a joint lawyer should step
down according to professional ethic rules.
For modeling it is a natural starting point to assume that spouses decide ﬁrst whether
to take a joint lawyer or not. If not, each spouse may decide to retain a separate
lawyer. Regime II implies a two stage game which is depicted by Figure 13 in the
Appendix. In the ﬁrst stage of the game both spouses decide simultaneously whether
to employ a joint lawyer (Ji) or not (NJi). If both spouse choose to make use of a
joint lawyer the game ends, but if only one or either spouse prefers not to employ a
joint lawyer, the game reaches a second stage. Their choice will of course crucially
depend on which payoﬀ they can expect in each case. Assuming that a joint lawyer
has to act in agreement with both clients, he will strive for a fair division in the legal
sense. What is a fair division in the legal sense? Most probably it is exactly the
division that the unaﬀected judge has in mind. Therefore, the payoﬀs in the case
with a joint lawyer should diﬀer from the case without any lawyer only by the joint
lawyer’s fee denoted by cJ. Each spouse knows that if they do not manage to agree
on a joint lawyer they face the prisoner’s dilemma provided that (1) or (2) hold.
Assuming that the joint lawyer’s fee is shared equally we solve this (potential) two
stage game by backwards induction and conditioning on inequality (2) it reduces to




Jw −cJ/2,−cJ/2 sw − cw,−sw − ch
NJw sw − cw,−sw − ch sw − cw,−sw − ch
Figure 3: Regime II, second stage conditioning on (2).
The payoﬀ matrix implies that a hiring a joint lawyer is a weakly dominant strategy
if the individual cost for hiring a joint lawyer are lower than the cost of a separate
14For instance, in the US no state today requires fault for the dissolution of a marriage (Brinig
and Buckley, 1998) and the most US-states have completely eliminated the principle of fault.
7lawyer minus his direct superiority:
cJ/2 < ci − si i = w,h. (3)
In other words, in the case of conditional lawyers’ eﬀects the incentive to hire a joint
lawyer in the ﬁrst stage of the game falls (rises) ceteris paribus with the superiority
of one’s own lawyer (the opponent’s lawyer) in the second stage of the game.
For the special case where the abilities of both spouses’ lawyers cancel each other
out in the courtroom, i.e. the direct superiority of lawyer i and j is zero, condition
(3) simpliﬁes to cJ/2 < ci. In that case hiring a joint lawyer is a weakly dominant
strategy as long as the individual cost of a joint lawyer are below the cost of hiring
a separate lawyer. In order to examine the likelihood of the favorable equilibrium
(Jw,Jh) in the general case we need to make a statement on the potential magnitudes
of the superiority of a lawyer. Therefore, we make an assumption on the remuneration
of lawyers in the second stage. If a lawyer (representing one spouse) is paid according
to his productivity (cw = lw and ch = lh), that means measured by his capacity to
shift the award then condition (3) simpliﬁes to cJ/2 < cj.
To sum up, under realistic assumptions the actions (Jw,Jh) constitute a Nash equi-
librium in an institutional setting which allows divorcing couples to hire a joint lawyer
as long as policy makers take care that a joint lawyer does not charge twice as much
as a lawyer representing one spouse only. The rationale behind hiring a joint lawyer
in the ﬁrst stage of the game is the thread of ending up in the prisoner’s dilemma
in the second stage of the game. Therefore, it is up to policy makers to prevent the
socially ineﬃcient equilibrium (Lw,Lh) and enable the second-best solution where
divorcing couples hire a joint lawyer.
2.3 Further dimensions of strategic interaction
So far we have neglected two further prevailing dimensions of strategic interaction:
There is (i) a potential conﬂict of interest between lawyers and clients and (ii) a
strategic interaction between lawyers.
Dispute resolution may be complicated by the fact that the lawyer’s interests are
not necessarily identical to his client’s. This potential conﬂict can be described as
a principal-agent problem. There are a number of papers in the economic literature
which try do design contracts between lawyers and their clients that favor eﬃcient
legal representation (Danzon, 1993; Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993; Polinsky and
Rubinfeld, 2002).15 This principal agent problem may ceteris paribus reduce the
incentive to hire a lawyer. Little attention has been devoted to the interaction
15The basic problem can be described as follows: If a lawyer is paid for his working hours
(irrespective of the outcome) he will spend more hours on the case than the client would want and
will have an excessive motive – relative to his client’s interest – to bring the case. Whereas if a
lawyer receives a fraction of any trial award or settlement and bears all of the cost – this so-called
contingent fee arrangement is widely used in the US – he may spend too little time on the case and
have an excessive motive to settle it (Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003).
8between lawyers in the economic literature.16 The encounter of two lawyers in the
courtroom introduces a third dimension of strategic interaction in the divorce process.
In contrast to the divorcing spouses who are very unlikely to divorce from each other
ever again lawyers will probably meet each other in a diﬀerent (divorce) trial again.
Therefore, from the spouses’ point of view the divorce process is best described as a
one-shot game. In contrast, the interaction between lawyers appears to be a (ﬁnitely)
repeated game. This repeated nature of the game constitutes – beside the outlined
principal-agent-problem – a further source of conﬂict of interest between lawyer and
his client. From experimental evidence we know that cooperation may arise as an
equilibrium outcome in ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (Andreoni and Miller,
1993). Therefore, the lawyers may embark on less aggressive strategies compared to
the situation they are the only lawyer in the courtroom. In terms of our model this
would imply that εi ≡ ¯ li − li increases if li tends to zero as lawyers treat each other
with care. Whether the lawyers’ tendency to cooperate aggravates or alleviates the
principal-agent-problem depends on the stipulated fee system.
3 Empirical analysis
The primary aim of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the involvement of
lawyers in a divorce process has a causal eﬀect on the divorce settlement. We use
four diﬀerent outcome variables to characterize the consequences of the involvement
of lawyers. To capture the division of matrimonial property we employ two outcome
measures: (i) the alimony award to the wife as a percentage of the husband’s income
and (ii) the child-support award for the oldest minor as a percentage of the husband’s
income. Thereby, we try to measure the payoﬀ matrices discussed in the theoretical
part of the paper and compare the beneﬁt of hiring a lawyer with the associated out of
pocket expenditures. Our third outcome measure is the length of the divorce process.
We employ this outcome in order to proxy for additional non-monetary/psychic cost
of the involvement of lawyers. Our fourth and ﬁnal outcome measure is the number of
post-divorce trials. We check whether the lawyers’ expertise aﬀects the sustainability
of divorce settlements over time. To identify causal eﬀects we employ a multiple
treatment matching procedure since we can use unusually informative micro-data
from divorce records.
3.1 Data and institutional setting
Our empirical analysis is based on data on divorce records of cases from ﬁve district
courts in Austria covering divorces initiated between 1997 and 2003. A divorce
record is an oﬃcial record comprising all relevant information the judge’s decision is
16Gilson and Mnookin (1994) argue in their ‘litigation game’ that two disputants (with or without
a lawyer) face a prisoners’ dilemma strategic structure: Each litigant can either cooperate by
voluntarily disclosing his private information or he can defect by refusing to provide it. However,
the other side can force disclosure which causes cost for both parties. The authors suggest that
the litigants may overcome this dilemma by hiring lawyers who have an interest in maintaining
reputations as cooperative types. There is experimental (Crosona and Mnookin, 1997) and empirical
(Johnston and Waldfogel, 2002) evidence for this commitment strategy.
9Table 1: The usage of lawyers in the diﬀerent samples.
Full sample Used sample
N = 6,049 N = 2,436
Neither spouse has a lawyer 77.00 77.22
Spouses have a joint lawyer 4.88 4.31
Both spouses have a lawyer 9.08 8.62
Only the wife has a lawyer 5.55 6.40
Only the husband has a lawyer 3.49 3.45
100.00 100.00
based on. This data set therefore contains comprehensive and accurate information
on the spouses, on any child, on the involvement of lawyers and on the outcome of
the divorce case. The only drawback of this data-set is caused by the fact that some
judges just annotate in the divorce record that the spouses declare their income (by
showing their account statements or a conﬁrmation) but do not record the amount.
Since the husband’s income is an essential variable in order to construct outcome
variables we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 2,436 observations which
include information on the husband’s income.17 Table 1 compares the distribution
of lawyer usage in the full sample and in this sub-sample. The distribution in the two
samples is very similar. The largest diﬀerence in a category is within one percentage
point. Therefore, we have no evidence that divorce cases with missing information
on the income are a selected group with respect to the usage of lawyers. This is not
surprising since couples are matched randomly to judges.
From the 2,436 couples in our data 2,256 (or 92.6 percent) have at least one joint
minor at the time of divorce. In about 98.7 percent the mother is the custodian.18
Until 2004 divorcing couples where free to hire a joint lawyer as presumed by Regime
II in the theoretical part of the paper. However, on 1 January 2005 a new draft
of the so-called Non-Contentious Proceedings Act entered into force and repealed
the possibility of joint lawyers. This change was justiﬁed by avoiding conﬂict of
interests between parties and following foreign models, for example Germany. Since
then couples are only allowed to hire separate lawyers as described by Regime I.
Our data covers the time period before the legal change. Figure 4 shows – upper
17The wife’s income is used as an explanatory variable only. Therefore, we impute for it in the
1,697 cases where the wife’s income is missing. Fortunately, we have very detailed information
on the wives’ occupations which allows us to impute for missing incomes based on a multivariate
OLS-regression. The explanatory variables in this regression comprise age at marriage, age at the
birth of the ﬁrst child, dummy variables for the diﬀerent occupations (unskilled blue collar worker,
skilled blue collar worker or craftsman, white collar worker, civil servant, self-employed, etc.), for
the place of birth, for citizenship and for the place of residence (zip-code). All coeﬃcients show the
expected sign and are of reasonable size. The predictive power of the regression is quite good with
an R
2 of 0.53.
18During marriage both parents hold parental responsibilities for a child. After divorce parents
have to arrange child custody. Traditionally divorcing parents had to assign sole custody to one
parent. In 2001, Austria has reformed the custody law after divorce. Joint custody is now the rule.
It continues after divorce, unless the parents agree on a sole custodian. Nevertheless, in order to
sustain joint custody parents have to agree on the primary residence of the child. For simplicity we
refer to this so-called ‘resident parent’ as custodian too.
10entries represent relative numbers and lower entries absolute numbers – that the
majority of all couples do not employ any lawyer (77.2 percent). The second largest
group consists of couples who hire a separate lawyer each. For these 8.6 percent
of all couples a divorce case may embody incentives associated with the prisoner’s
dilemma. Couples where only the wife is represented by a lawyer account for 6.4
percent of all cases. A small group of couples (4.3 percent) manage to cooperate and
hire a joint lawyer.19 Most uncommon are couples where only the husband employs

















Figure 4: Usage of lawyers for all spouses (N = 2,436).
We now consider whether hiring a lawyer is associated with advantageous awards. In
a ﬁrst step we capture the division of matrimonial property by the monthly alimony
award to the wife as a share of the husband’s monthly income.
According to Austrian Law the alimony award is predominantly determined by the
grounds for divorce.21 If the spouses divorce on the grounds of fault/irretrievable
breakdown the sole or predominantly guilty party must generally pay alimony. The
amount of alimony depends primarily on the spouses’ ﬁnancial circumstances. For a
divorce by mutual consent it is only necessary that the spouses agree on alimony.
The simple descriptive statistics in Figure 5 suggest that wives from couples without
any lawyer get on average the lowest alimony payment of about 5.7 percent of the
husband’s income. For couples where only the husband is represented by a lawyer we
obtain a slightly higher mean alimony payment of about 7.3 percent. For wives from
the group with a joint lawyer and for the group where only the wife has a lawyer we
19In terms of the theoretical considerations, for these couples the game ends in the ﬁrst stage.
20As Figure 14 in the Appendix shows the usage of lawyers is similar for the sub-sample of spouses
with at least one minor.
21The Austrian divorce law provides basically two diﬀerent grounds for divorce: (i) Divorce on
the ground of fault/irretrievable breakdown and (ii) divorce by mutual consent. While the ﬁrst
type of divorce is closed by a verdict the second type requires a settlement. In practice, the judge
takes an active part in ﬁnding and formulating a settlement. Divorce by mutual consent has been
introduced in 1978 and since then it has extremely increased in popularity, probably because it
is the cheapest way to obtain divorce. In 2003, about 88 percent of all divorces were divorces by
mutual consent. Nevertheless, many divorce cases are initiated by a lawsuit, meaning that one or
either spouse aims to obtain a divorce by the ground of fault/irretrievable breakdown of the other
spouse, and during the divorce process they turn in to a divorce by mutual consent.
11obtain fairly similar mean awards around 15 percent. The highest award is obtained

















Figure 5: Mean of alimony award as percentage of husband’s income for all spouses.
(N = 2,436 – standard errors are in brackets below)
While it is reasonable that wives who are the only party represented by a lawyer
obtain a higher award compared to wives without a lawyer, the remaining ordering
suggested by these descriptive statistics seems odd. However, as we pointed out
in the theoretical part of the paper spouses will hire a lawyer only if the expected
beneﬁt of doing so outweighs the cost. Therefore, the involvement of lawyers is likely
the result of systematic decisions and the sample of spouses with lawyers will not be
random. It is yet impossible to decide whether the order of alimony awards is due
to a causal eﬀect of lawyers or due to a systematic selection of couples with fairly
diﬀerent characteristics into speciﬁc situations. In the next section we present our
estimation strategy to disentangle these two factors and to uncover causal eﬀects of
lawyers.
3.2 The problem of causal inference
The ultimate aim of our empirical analysis is to identify causal eﬀects. We would like
to ask questions like ‘By how much would the wife’s alimony award – who actually
has hired a lawyer – diﬀer if she would have not had a lawyer?’. In order to answer
this question we would ideally be able to observe the wife with and without a lawyer.
Since this is in reality not possible it is usually referred as the fundamental problem
of causal inference (Holland, 1986a). We cannot infer the eﬀect of the lawyer because
we do not have the counterfactual evidence, i.e. what would have happened in the
absence of the wife’s lawyer. The statistical approaches to solve such a problem
aim to identify average causal eﬀects. Therefore, we translate this problem into
a treatment-control situation typical of the experimental framework (Rubin, 1974)
and utilize its terminology. We refer to the representation by a lawyer as a so-called
treatment and the resulting alimony award is termed outcome. In our speciﬁc case we
have four diﬀerent treatments: ‘spouses have a joint lawyer’ or TJL, ‘both spouses
have a lawyer’ or TL,L, ‘only the wife has a lawyer’ or TL,NL and ‘only the husband
has a lawyer’ or TNL,L. The case where neither spouse has a lawyer is the special
12case of the treatment type ‘no treatment’. Therefore, we will refer to it as control
group, T0. We are primarily interested in the comparison of the causal eﬀect of each
of the following treatments
Tj, where j ∈ {JL;L,L;L,NL;NL,L}, (4)
on the outcome compared to the case without any lawyer, T0. Since we argue in a
treatment-control framework it is not relevant whether we state that the wife and/or
the husband receive a certain treatment. In order to avoid confusion we refer to a
participant of a treatment as a unit. In the following empirical analysis we aim to
simulate an experimental setting and do not follow a behavioral approach per se.
Therefore, we will focus on the eﬀect of certain treatments on various outcomes,
rather than on describing why units choose diﬀerent treatments.
The set of potential outcomes associated with these treatments is given by Y JL ,
Y L,L, Y L,NL and Y NL,L. The outcome associated with the control case is denoted by
Y 0. Every unit either belongs to the control group or receives exactly one of the treat-
ments. Therefore, for any unit only one element of
￿
Y 0,Y JL,Y L,L,Y L,NL,Y NL,L￿
is observable and the remaining 4 outcomes are counterfactuals. The deﬁnition of
(average) treatment eﬀects for the case of multiple treatments – compared to the
case of a binary treatment – is extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) who
describe this as pair-wise comparisons of the eﬀects of two particular treatments. For
instance, consider the comparison of treatment Tj and T0. The expected average
eﬀect of treatment Tj relative to T0 for a unit drawn randomly from the population
(the Average Treatment Eﬀect, ATETj,T0
) is given by
ATETj,T0
= E(Y j − Y 0) = E(Y j) − (Y 0). (5)
This average treatment eﬀect is symmetric, i.e. ATETj,T0
= −ATET0,Tj
. Similarly,
the expected average eﬀect of treatment Tj relative to T0 for a unit drawn ran-
domly from the sub-population actually participating in treatment Tj (the Average
Treatment Eﬀect on Treated, ATTTj,T0
) is given by
ATTTj,T0
= E(Y j − Y 0|Tj) = E(Y j|Tj) − (Y 0|Tj). (6)
This treatment eﬀect is only symmetric – i.e. ATTTj,T0
= −ATTT0,Tj
– if partici-
pants in treatments Tj and T0 do not diﬀer.22
In an ideal setting one would like to compare units with a treatment Tj and one
from the control group, T0, who have the same values of all relevant characteristics
(i.e. units who are observably identical). For obvious reasons, this procedure suﬀers
22We concentrate on these two treatment eﬀects. However, note these are only two examples
of many possible treatment eﬀects. One can deﬁne diﬀerent treatment eﬀects with respect to
comparisons of types of treatments and with respect to populations under consideration. For
instance, consider the expected average eﬀect of treatment T
k relative to treatment T
l (l  = k)
for a unit drawn randomly from the sub-population actually participating in either T
k or T
l. This















, where weights are given
by the participation probabilities in the respective treatments T
k and T
l. In Section 4 we explore
the issue of treatment heterogeneity.
13from multi-dimensionality. To overcome this dimensionality problem Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) propose for the binary treatment case an equivalent and feasible
estimation strategy based on the concept of the so-called propensity score. The
propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given the
vector of relevant characteristics X. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if
assignment to treatment is random within cells deﬁned by X then it is also random
within cells deﬁned by the mono-dimensional propensity score.
Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) show that properties similar to the propensity
score hold in the multiple treatment case for pair-wise comparisons as well. In par-
ticular, Lechner (2001, Proposition 3) shows that in order to identify the ATETj,T0
and the ATTTj,T0
it is suﬃcient to obtain information on the sub-population actu-
ally participating in treatment Tj and T0. As a consequence two possibilities are
available to estimate the selection probabilities, which can then be used as input to
a matching estimator. Firstly, one can estimate binary choice models on the dif-
ferent sub-samples to obtain the binary conditional probabilities. This approach is
called the reduced-form approach. This estimation strategy closely mirrors the con-
ventional approach for binary treatments. Secondly, one can formulate a complete
multinomial-choice model to estimate the conditional probabilities. This approach
is called structural approach. Lechner (2002) considers the relative performance of
the reduced-form approach and the structural approach by estimating a multinomial
probit model in the case of a Swiss labor market programs. He ﬁnds little diﬀerence
in their relative performances. Nevertheless, he concludes that the reduced-form ap-
proach may be more robust, since a mis-speciﬁcation in the structural approach in
one series may spill over. Therefore, we follow the reduced-form approach.
3.3 Identiﬁcation strategy
In the following we explain the procedure of our empirical analysis and discuss the
assumptions which have to be fulﬁlled in order to identify average treatment eﬀects.
In order to make any statement on causal eﬀects the assumption of stable unit treat-
ment value (SUTVA) has to be made (Rubin, 1980, 1986; Holland, 1986b). SUTVA
requires that potential outcomes and treatments of unit m are independent of the
potential assignments, treatments and outcomes of unit n  = m and therefore rules
out any cross-eﬀects or general equilibrium eﬀects. In our speciﬁc case we can credi-
bly argue that SUTVA is fulﬁlled since it is not plausible that the divorce settlement
or the hiring decision of one couple is inﬂuenced by the hiring decision or the divorce
settlement of a diﬀerent couple.
To estimate the ATETj,T0
and the ATTTj,T0
via the reduced form approach we need
the conditional probability of receiving the treatment Tj compared to T0 given the
vector of attributes X. We estimate the propensity score based on the data on the
sub-population actually participating in treatment Tj and T0 with a probit model.
The identiﬁcation of average causal eﬀects depends now crucially on the so-called
14conditional independence assumption (CIA) formalized in equation (7).
Y 0,Y JL,Y L,L,Y L,NL,Y NL,L ⊥⊥ Tj|b(X) = b(x), ∀ x ∈ χ
if E
￿







0 < Pj(x) < 1, ∀j = 0;JL;L,L;L,NL;NL,L
(7)
The CIA requires that all potential outcomes are independent of the assignment
mechanism conditioning on a given vector of attributes X, in an attribute space χ.
The CIA therefore requires that all characteristics that jointly aﬀect the potential
outcomes as well the assignment into treatments to be observable. The plausibil-
ity of this strong assumption heavily relies on the amount and quality of available
information. In turn, the credibility of multiple treatment matching as a tool for
causal inference depends therefore crucially on the quality and amount of observable
pre-treatment characteristics X.
In fact, the choice of multiple treatment matching as an empirical tool for this anal-
ysis was motivated by the richness and the accuracy of the available information on
the divorce cases. We can control for the detailed background variables available in
divorce records. A divorce record is an oﬃcial record comprising all relevant infor-
mation on which the judge’s decision is based. Therefore, a divorce record consists
of socio-economic information on the whole family, transcripts of all proceedings,
the correspondence between the litigants and the court, diﬀerent certiﬁcates, the
judgment or the settlement.23 In our probit estimations we control for the spouses’
labor market status, for their income, for their age at the time of divorce, for their
education, for their citizenship, for their former marriages, for their number of joint
non-minors, for their number of joint minors, for the child’s/children’s age, for the
length of marriage, for any spouses’ further support obligations, for any real estate(s),
for any liabilities, for the judge’s sex and for the courts where divorce took place as
well for a time trend.24 Note, the CIA allows only to match on time constant factors
and variables that are not determined or aﬀected by the treatment. For instance, the
allocation of custody may be inﬂuenced by the presence of a lawyer. Conditioning on
it would tamper that part of the causal eﬀect of a lawyer on alimony that operates
through custody allocation. In each and every estimation the balancing property is
satisﬁed, i.e. it is guaranteed that units from the control group and treatment group
23We collected the data from divorce records on-site at the district courts. The time we needed
to pick and type the relevant information varied widely with the complexity of the case and could
take up to an hour for just one case.
24The selection into all four treatments (compared to the control group) is positively related to
the existence of any real estate(s). Apart from that, the results indicate that the selection into the
four treatments is driven by quite diﬀerent determinants. For instance, the probability of selection
into the treatment ‘both spouses have a lawyer’ is decreasing with the husband’s education, with the
number of the husband’s further support obligations, with the length of marriage, with the children’s
age (but at a decreasing rate) and rising with the husband’s income. Whereas the selection into
the treatment ‘only the wife has a lawyer’ is decreasing with the wife’s education, with the number
of joint non-minors, with the length of marriage (but at a decreasing rate) and with the number
of the husband’s former marriages. The main determinants of the selection into the cooperative
treatment ‘spouses have a joint lawyer’ are the number of joint minors, their age and the spouses
previous divorce experience. The estimation results are not presented in the paper but of course
available upon request.
15with the same propensity score have the same observable characteristics.25
In general, the best feasible way to assess whether propensity score matching is an
appropriate empirical tool for the research design and the data in question is to in-
spect the overlap between the treatment and control units in terms of the propensity
score. A suﬃcient overlap indicates that the assumption of selection on observables
is reasonable. Figures 16 to 19 in the Appendix plot the histograms of the estimated
propensity scores for the control couples and the respective treated couples. If there
is selection into treatment control couples should have on average lower propensity
scores compared to treated. Therefore, as expected the propensity score distribution
of the control couples is in each case skewed to the left. In fact, it is one of the
strengths of the propensity score method to highlight this fact dramatically (Dehejia
and Wahba, 2002). However, most importantly we see that in each case there is
substantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity score between the control
and treatment couples. This indicates that propensity score matching is an appropri-
ate tool for the estimation of causal eﬀects of the involvement of lawyers on divorce
settlements. We are conﬁdent that after controlling for our rich set of information,
there is little unobservable heterogeneity left that is correlated with our outcome
measures and the hiring of lawyers.
Finally, to calculate average treatment eﬀects we have to compare the outcomes of
as similar as possible control and treatment couples. Obviously, the probability of
observing couples with identical propensity scores tends to be zero. To overcome
this problem one usually employs a matching estimator. We follow the advise of
Lechner (2002) and employ a simple and stable matching algorithm: We match each
treated couple with the control couple that is closest in terms of the propensity score
(nearest neighbor matching).26 Thereby, a couple from the control group can serve
as best match for more than one treated couple.27 Unmatched control couples are
completely disregarded. The average treatment eﬀects are then estimated as the
average of all the diﬀerences in the outcomes of pairs of treated couples and matched
control couples.28
25To be more concrete, after every estimation we have split the sample in 5 equally spaced intervals
of the propensity score. In each interval, we have then tested that the average propensity score of
treated and control units does not diﬀer. If the test has failed in an interval, we have split this
interval again until in all intervals treated and control units had the same average propensity score.
Given that, we have then checked within each interval that the means of each explanatory variable
does not diﬀer between treated and control units at least at a level of 0.01. If the mean of one or
more variables has diﬀered we have chosen a less parsimonious speciﬁcation of b(x) by including
higher order terms and/or interaction terms of the variables with diﬀerent means.
26Denote the set of control units matched to the treated unit m with an estimated propensity
score Pm by Cm. The nearest neighbor matching procedure sets Cm = min||Pm − Pn||.
27In principle, one can consider each untreated couple only once (‘without replacement’). How-
ever, since matching ‘with replacement’ minimizes the propensity-score distance between matched
control couples and the treatment couple we can beneﬁt in terms of bias reduction (Dehejia and
Wahba, 2002).
28The matching procedure is performed over the region of common support, i.e. treated units
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of
the control units are disregarded. However, our results are not sensitive to the common support
restriction. For details see Section 4.
163.4 Division of matrimonial property
In this section we present our estimates of the average causal eﬀects of our four
diﬀerent treatments on the division of matrimonial property. First we consider the
alimony award to the wife as a percentage of the husband’s income. The estimation

















Figure 6: Average treatment eﬀects on treated on the alimony award as percentage
of the husband’s income compared to (NL,NL). (t-statistics are in brackets below)
The ﬁrst entry represents the estimated average treatment eﬀect on treated and the
second entry the t-statistic. Each ATT has to be interpreted as the average causal
eﬀect of the respective treatment compared to the situation without any lawyer (for
a unit actually participating in this treatment). Our estimation shows that just in
the case where only the wife has hired a lawyer the alimony award is statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerent from the award which wives from couples receive where neither
spouse has a lawyer. The causal eﬀect of the wife’s lawyer is equal to an increased
alimony award of 5.4 percent of the husband’s income. The causal eﬀect of the
remaining treatments on the alimony award is zero.29
These results have immediate implications: (i) Couples who have hired a lawyer each
are indeed in a prisoners’ dilemma. Both incur cost but the award is precisely the
same as would have occurred if neither spouse had hired a lawyer. (ii) Our empirical
results aﬃrm the assumption from the theoretical part that the award in the case
with a joint lawyer does not diﬀer from the case without any lawyer. Therefore,
an institutional setting facilitating the engagement of a joint lawyer compared to
the involvement of two separate lawyers is indeed a second-best solution. (iii) Since
the husband’s lawyer has no eﬀect in the case where he is the only lawyer in the
courtroom, but oﬀsets the eﬀect of the wife’s lawyer in a direct confrontation, the
assumption of conditional lawyers’ eﬀects seems to be appropriate. (iv) From this it
follows that lawyers seem to be more important for women compared to men. One
possible explanation is that the Austrian legal system or the legal practice may oﬀer
29The average treatment eﬀect of T
L,NL for a unit randomly drawn from the population,
ATE
TL,NL,T0
, is equal to an increased alimony award of 4.5 percent of the husband’s income.
This reduced population eﬀect is not surprising, since hiring a lawyer should be more eﬃcient for
the sub-population of women actually hiring a lawyer compared to an arbitrary one. We explore
the issue of treatment heterogeneity in more detail in Section 4.
17room to negotiate only in favor of women. (v) Does the involvement of the lawyer
pay of for a wife if her husband has no lawyer? On average wives (husbands) are 35
(38) years old at the time of divorce. According to the Austrian Statistical Oﬃce the
wife’s further life expectancy is about 47 years and the husband’s one about 39 years.
Therefore, a wife can expect 39 years alimony payments by her former husband.30
Since the husbands average monthly income is equal to e1,368 the engagement of a
lawyer generates according to our estimates an additional monthly alimony payment
of e74.5. If we assume a yearly interest rate of 5 percent the causal eﬀect of the
lawyer is equal to a present value of about e15,320. We do not have information on
the lawyer’s fee for each case in our data. In practice, the lawyer’s fee for a divorce
by mutual consent amounts up to e2,000 to e7,000.31 Therefore, considering only
these out-of pocket expenses the engagement of the lawyer certainly pays oﬀ for these
wives.
3.4.1 Child-support award
So far we have examined the eﬀect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property
captured by the alimony award. While the alimony award is an essential part of the
divorce settlement the allocation of child custody and corresponding child-support
awards are crucial issues for parents of minors. While it is straightforward to estimate
the impact of lawyers on the child-support award we refrain from quantifying their
eﬀect on child custody.32
In contrast to the alimony award, all arrangements relating to minors are irrespective
of the grounds of divorce. The non-custodian parent is obliged to pay child-support
after divorce until the child can support itself. According to law, the amount of
child-support corresponds to the age of the child, to the parents’ living standards, to
possible further support obligations of the non-custodian parent and especially to the
non-custodian’s net income.33 Due to these stricter regulations and the ceiling there
is a reduced possibility for bargaining in the case of child-support award compared
to the alimony award. This fact is reﬂected in the descriptive statistics. Figure 7
summarizes the average child-support award as percentage of husband’s income for
spouses with minors by the usage of lawyers. Compared to the alimony award we
now observe much less variation across and within groups. The highest child-support
30Of course, the alimony payments ﬂow may stop earlier, if for instance the wife remarries.
31In principle, the lawyer’s fee is regulated by law and it is calculated based on the amount in
dispute. However, client and lawyer are generally free to reach any agreement. In the case of a
divorce by fault the lawyer’s fee can be possibly much higher, depending on the complexity of the
case and the speciﬁc fee arrangement.
32This is due to couple of reasons: (i) A monetarization of custody is well beyond the scope of
this paper. However, without that it is not feasible to quantify the payoﬀ matrices in this case.
It is only possible to observe who gets custody. (ii) Preferences may be more important in the
context of custody compared to regular alimony and child-support payments and (iii) custody is
still consuetudinarily awarded to the mothers in Austria.
33In practice, the actual amount is determined by age-related average rates of the non-custodian’s
net income (recommended by the Department of Justice) and by age-related regular needs (recom-
mended by the Department of Finance). A child should at least receive this age-related regular
needs but not receive more than twice (2.5 times) the value for a child below (over) ten 10 years of
age.
18awards (about 18 percent of the father’s income) are obtain by minors whose parents
divorce without any lawyer. Minors from the group where only one parent has hired
a lawyer and minors whose parents have a joint lawyer obtain fairly similar mean
awards around 17 percent. The lowest mean award (about 16 percent) is obtained

















Figure 7: Mean of child-support award as percentage of husband’s income for spouses
with minors. (N = 2,256 – standard errors are in brackets below)
The estimation of our average treatment eﬀects on treated of our four diﬀerent treat-
ments on the outcome child-support award is summarized by Figure 8. Again, the
ﬁrst entry represents the estimated ATT and the second entry the t-statistic. Each
ATT has to be interpreted as the average causal eﬀect of the respective treatment

















Figure 8: Average treatment eﬀects on treated on child-support award as percentage
of the husband’s income compared to (NL,NL). (t-statistics are in brackets below)
However, we obtain no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the child-support awards in
situations with diﬀerent combinations of lawyers compared to the situation without
any lawyer.
So far we know that the net beneﬁt of hiring a lawyer is clearly negative for both
spouses in a situation where both of them have a lawyer. Each spouse has to pay
lawyer fees but does not gain from the lawyer’s services compared to the situation
without any lawyer. The same is true for spouses who have hired a joint lawyer.
19However, they have to pay for one lawyer only. Surprisingly we observe that even
in the case where only the husband has hired a lawyer the division of matrimonial
property is not diﬀerent compared to the situation without any lawyer. Just in the
case where only the wife has hired a lawyer there is a shift in the alimony award.
To evaluate further aspects of the divorce process we now proceed to the estimation
of the causal eﬀect of lawyers on two further important dimensions of the divorce
process: (i) the length of the divorce process and (ii) the number of post-divorce
trials.
3.5 Length of the divorce process
Longitudinal studies show that the psychological well-being of divorcing spouses –
quantiﬁed by standard mental well-being measures and by life satisfaction scores
– decreases in the run-up to divorce, reaches its minimum in the period of divorce,
but subsequently improves as time passes (Booth and Amato, 1991; Gardner and
Oswald, 2006).34 Therefore, while out of pocket expenditures for lawyers are sub-
stantial further costs may arise if the involvement of lawyers unnecessarily prolongs
the divorce process. We measure the length of the divorce process as the time span
from the ﬁrst hearing at court to the ﬁnal decision. Simple descriptive statistics
(Figure 9) hint that there is indeed a diﬀerence in the average length of divorce pro-
cesses by the involvement of lawyers.35 The quickest divorces processes are divorces




















Figure 9: Mean length of divorce in days for all spouses (N = 2,431 – standard
errors are in brackets below)
Couples without any lawyer need longer to divorce (on average about 56 days).
Divorce processes where only one spouse (either the wife or the husband) has retained
a lawyer last on average 65 to 72 days. The longest divorce processes are for couples
34On average people improve their psychological wellbeing two years after divorce compared to
years before (Gardner and Oswald, 2006).
35Note, we have excluded 5 outliers with divorce lengths above 1,000 days for the analysis in this
section.
20who both hired a lawyer: In these cases a divorce will take them on average 120
days. This is also the group with the largest standard deviation.36
However, as outlined above the decision to hire a lawyer is non-random and these
simple descriptive statistics may be biased by the existence of confounding factors.
Therefore, we estimate the average treatment eﬀects of our four diﬀerent treatments
by employing the strategy described in Section 3.3. The estimated ATT’s are sum-



















Figure 10: Average treatment eﬀects on treated on the length of the divorce process
compared to (NL,NL). (t-statistics are in brackets below)
The results of the estimation of the ATT’s suggest an ordering of divorce process
lengths which is similar to the ordering suggested by a simple comparison of means.
Nevertheless, considering the t-statistics the multiple treatment matching shows that
divorce processes with a joint lawyer and where only the husband has a lawyer do
not have a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent length compared to divorces without any
lawyer. Whereas, if only the wife has hired a lawyer or both spouses have hired
a lawyer the divorce processes will last longer compared to the case without any
lawyer. In the case where the wife has a lawyer we obtain a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of 25 days. The involvement of two lawyers prolongs the process by 67 days.37
These delays constitute an excess burden of the involvement of lawyers and increase
both the private and public cost of divorce. Families are exposed to additional painful
(adversary) proceedings which encumber courts and burden the national budget.
Moreover, underage children have to suﬀer an additional period with unresolved
issues such as custody allocation and cannot start to accustom to an unwanted but
stable situation.
In the previous section we concluded that considering out of pocket expenditures the
involvement of a lawyer ﬁnancially beneﬁts a wife if her husband has no lawyer. We
now observe that the lawyer prolongs the divorce cases by about 1 month compared
36As Figure 15 in the Appendix shows the mean lengths of divorce are quite similar for the
sub-sample of spouses with minors.





are equal to 15 days and 41 days. Theses results suggest that
selection into the treatments T
L,NL and T
L,L is positively correlated with outcome measure length
of the divorce process.
21to the case without any lawyer. Whether this extended divorce process generates
additional monetary and/or psychic cost which outweigh the positive net-present
value is an open issue.
3.6 Post-divorce trials
So far we have shown that involvement of lawyers – except for the case where only
the wife hired a lawyer – does neither alter the alimony award nor the child-support
award. However, lawyers prolong the divorce process and generate, in addition to
their substantial fees, monetary and/or psychic cost for all parties involved. So far
we have no argument which supports the involvement of lawyers in divorce pro-
cesses. However, one could justify the involvement of lawyers and the associated
cost if their expertise leads to a low number of post divorce re-negotiations. If an
agreement between spouses, reached with or without the help of lawyers, leads to no
re-negotiation, we may consider this agreement sustainable. In contrast, if an agree-
ment leads to re-negotiation, we may deem this divorce settlement unsustainable.
Of course, it is both in the public interest and in the separated families’ interest
to achieve a sustainable divorce settlement in order to minimize ceteris paribus the
cost of divorce. In this section we therefore try to uncover the causal eﬀect of the
involvement of lawyers on the sustainability of divorce settlements.
Our data set allows us to follow spouses with at least one minor at the time of
divorce for one district court over time and to observe if either spouse or a public
authority ﬁles an application for a modiﬁcation of the divorce settlement concerning
the minor(s).38 From these 1,174 couples 24.62 percent go to trial at least once
after divorce.39 The average number of subsequent trials for the whole sample is
0.49. Figure 11 shows the percentage of cases with at least one subsequent trial, the
number of average subsequent trials and the number of cases for the four treatment
groups and the control group.
38The reason that we have these information for only one of the ﬁve district courts is simply
due to ﬁnancial restrictions. In order to have a reasonable number of observations available for
the empirical analysis in this section we now use the observations with missing information on the
husband’s income too. This procedure is now unproblematic since the construction of the outcome
variable does not depend on the husband’s income. Of course, we use the husband’s income as
an explanatory variable in our probit estimations where we impute for missing observations on the
basis of multivariate OLS-regressions equivalently as outlined above.
39In the majority of the cases (about 34 percent) the wife is the applicant of the (ﬁrst) subsequent
trial. In 30 percent of the cases the husband requests a modiﬁcation. In 11 percent of the cases the
parents ﬁll jointly an application for a modiﬁcation and in the remaining 25 percent of the cases
a public authority approaches the court. The majority of the subsequent trials (about 80 percent)
concerns the child-support award. The remaining 20 percent of the cases regard the arrangement

















Figure 11: Percentage of cases with at least one subsequent trial, the number of
average subsequent trials and the number of cases.
Considering the number of average subsequent trials we see that couples where only
the husband had a lawyer at divorce go on trial most often. Couples without any
lawyer and those were only the wife had a legal representation have on average about
0.4 subsequent trials. The group with the lowest number of subsequent trials (about
0.35) consists of couples who had a either a joint lawyer or a lawyer each. In order
to account for confounding factors we employ the estimation strategy described in
Section 3.3. The estimated average treatment eﬀects on treated of our four diﬀerent



















Figure 12: Average treatment eﬀects on treated on the number of subsequent trials
compared to (NL,NL). (t-statistics are in brackets below)
The results show that neither combination of lawyers has a causal eﬀect on the
sustainability of divorce settlements compared to the situation without any lawyer.
Therefore, the involvement of lawyers does not alter the sustainability of divorce
settlements.
4 Robustness of the empirical ﬁndings
Let us now examine the robustness of the results reported in Section 3.4 to 3.6.
We have carried out several sensitivity checks concerning (i) the estimation of the
23propensity score, (ii) the restriction to the common support and (iii) the treatment
eﬀect heterogeneity.
Firstly, instead of a probit model we have estimated the propensity score with a
logit model. The estimates of the average treatment eﬀects are robust with respect
to this change. Secondly, we have checked the sensitivity of the results due to the
restriction of common support. By imposing the common support restriction the
quality of the matches improves. However, as Lechner (2001) argues the deﬁnition
of the average treatment eﬀects is now changed for a narrower population. This
causes a problem if the treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous inside and outside the
region of common support. Without imposing the restriction to the common support
we obtain no qualitative diﬀerences and quantitative eﬀects that are similar to the
ones already presented. This is not surprising since the loss of observations due to
the restriction to the common support is very small in our case40 and we have no
evidence for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects over the propensity score distribution
(see next point). The third set of sensitivity checks relate to the treatment eﬀect
heterogeneity. We implement a regression analogy of the propensity score matching
within the sample of matched control and treated units. Thereby we also check the
robustness of the estimated average eﬀects of the treatment j on the outcome k.
outcomek = α + θT
j
i + δ1 ˆ P
j
i (X) + δ2[ ˆ P
j
i (X)]2 + δ3[ ˆ P
j
i (X) − ¯ Pj]   T
j
i + ui (8)
We simply include the estimated propensity score, ˆ P
j
i (X), as a regressor. The
propensity score summarizes the selection bias by a single index and plays the role
of a control function. In order to allow for more ﬂexibility in the functional form of
the control function we add the estimated propensity score squared, [ ˆ P
j
i (X)]2. Un-
der CIA θ consistently estimates the ATETj,T0
. The interaction of the deviation of
individual propensity score from the mean propensity score and treatment dummy,
[ ˆ P
j
i (X) − ¯ Pj]   T
j
i , is included to allow for heterogeneous treatment eﬀects over the
propensity score distribution. A positive δ3 would indicate that units with a higher
propensity to take the treatment have larger treatment eﬀects. However, since δ3 is
not statistically signiﬁcant the results (Tables 3 and 4) indicate that there are no
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects over the propensity score distribution.41
5 Summary
We present a structural model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers
in their divorce process. Our theoretical considerations show that they encounter
incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma. Therefore, we propose a simple
institutional setting allowing for a joint lawyer to overcome this socially ineﬃcient
situation and facilitate a second-best solution.
In our empirical analysis we employ rich micro-data from court records. A multiple
treatment matching procedure shows that it is ﬁnancially beneﬁcial for the wife to
40On average we only loose 1.9 percent of our treated units.
41In a further speciﬁcation we have additionally controlled for X in equation (8) to gauge the
balancing quality of propensity score. However, the estimates of δ3 remain unchanged.
24hire a lawyer, if she expects their husband not to. The lawyer increases the wife’s
alimony award in this case by 5.4 percent of the husband’s income. This is equal to an
average present value of e15,320. For all other combinations we do not identify any
causal eﬀect of the involvement of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property:
The child-support award and the alimony award would have been precisely the same
as in the case where neither spouse had hired a lawyer. There exists also no beneﬁt
of the engagement of lawyers in terms of more sustainable divorce settlements over
time. Therefore, many spouses incur substantial lawyer fees without any beneﬁt.
On top of that in most of the cases lawyers prolong the divorce process. This excess
burden of lawyers increases both the private and public cost of divorce. In the case
where both spouses hire a lawyer, the highest lawyer fees accrue and the divorce
process is extended unnecessarily by about 2 months. In order to overcome this
worst case we suggest to change the institutional setting so that as many of these
couples as possible choose to hire a joint lawyer. A joint lawyer does not alter the
divorce settlement either, should charge a lower fee and most importantly does not
unnecessarily delay the divorce process. In any case it should be guaranteed that in a
case of a conﬂict of interests a joint lawyer should step down according to professional
ethic rules.
At this point we want to stress once more that we do not capture all aspects of
lawyers’ services. Spouses may beneﬁt from their lawyers apart from their ability to
extract a monetary pay-oﬀ. Therefore, it may well be in this case that the adminis-
trative and moral support justiﬁes the associated costs.
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Figure 15: Mean length of divorce in days for spouses with minors. (N = 2,256
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spouses have no lawyer only the wife has a lawyer
Figure 16: Treatment ‘only the wife has a lawyer’: Histogram of the estimated
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Figure 17: Treatment ‘only the husband has a lawyer’: Histogram of the estimated
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Figure 18: Treatment ‘spouses have a lawyer each’: Histogram of the estimated
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Figure 19: Treatment ‘spouses have a joint lawyer’: Histogram of the estimated
propensity score for the treated and the control units.
34Table 3: Robustness checks of the outcomes alimony award and child-support award.
j = spouses have a joint lawyer j = spouses have a lawyer each j = only the wife has a lawyer j = only the husband has a lawyer
Dependent variable: alimony award as percentage of the husband’s income
T
j 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.063 0.064 0.063 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
ˆ P
j(X) 0.306 0.224 0.190 0.312 0.823 0.853 0.549 0.846 0.959 0.358 0.745 0.896
(0.114)*** (0.269) (0.284) (0.059)*** (0.168)*** (0.173)*** (0.095)*** (0.238)*** (0.238)*** (0.269) (1.188) (1.338)
[ ˆ P
j(X)]
2 0.127 0.105 -0.607 -0.543 -0.525 -0.419 -1.507 -1.087
(0.446) (0.431) (0.205)*** (0.220)** (0.384) (0.492) (4.118) (3.913)
[ ˆ P
j(X)] ∗ T
j 0.080 -0.116 -0.269 -0.441
(0.220) (0.136) (0.231) (0.572)
Constant 0.085 0.092 0.100 0.078 0.018 0.006 -0.001 -0.025 -0.044 0.079 0.063 0.047
(0.033)** (0.038)** (0.043)** (0.019)*** (0.022) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019)** (0.036)** (0.068) (0.082)
N 195 195 195 364 364 364 290 290 290 162 162 162
R
2 0.058 0.060 0.060 0.098 0.125 0.128 0.174 0.180 0.187 0.020 0.021 0.026
Dependent variable: child-support award as percentage of the husband’s income
T
j 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ˆ P
j(X) -0.046 -0.106 -0.117 -0.049 -0.035 -0.020 -0.031 0.041 0.036 -0.101 0.062 0.071
(0.015)*** (0.048)** (0.049)** (0.016)*** (0.057) (0.066) (0.032) (0.098) (0.116) (0.052)* (0.176) (0.171)
[ ˆ P
j(X)]
2 0.078 0.041 -0.017 -0.005 -0.115 -0.120 -0.572 -0.518
(0.058) (0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.110) (0.097) (0.546) (0.615)
[ ˆ P
j(X)] ∗ T
j 0.056 -0.039 0.013 -0.038
(0.034) (0.037) (0.073) (0.118)
Constant 0.179 0.185 0.190 0.188 0.187 0.182 0.176 0.170 0.171 0.180 0.173 0.172
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
N 172 172 172 319 319 319 246 246 246 149 149 149
R
2 0.038 0.047 0.053 0.043 0.043 0.048 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.051 0.051 0.051Table 4: Robustness checks of the outcomes length of the divorce process and number of subsequent trials.
j = spouses have a joint lawyer j = spouses have a lawyer each j = only the wife has a lawyer j = only the husband has a lawyer
Dependent variable: length of the divorce process in days
T
j -9.991 -9.880 -9.791 63.195 63.160 64.088 23.811 23.804 23.796 13.375 12.904 12.462
(6.114) (6.115) (6.074) (11.246)*** (11.194)*** (11.259)*** (8.351)*** (8.349)*** (8.286)*** (11.579) (11.388) (11.186)
ˆ P
j(X) -8.864 25.151 17.394 55.427 45.099 26.782 5.028 -0.877 -0.195 5.523 -300.38 -172.31
(15.483) (46.218) (47.968) (40.729) (94.719) (95.847) (32.376) (92.439) (86.648) (89.165) (344.43) (304.03)
[ ˆ P
j(X)]
2 -52.625 -58.158 13.418 -11.224 10.420 11.050 1,213.6 1,675.1
(57.865) (58.366) (136.56) (133.59) (138.43) (143.74) (1,256.7) (1,141.8)
[ ˆ P
j(X)] ∗ T
j 18.852 55.091 -1.607 -425.52
(29.804) (60.715) (58.352) (174.13)**
Constant 55.918 52.988 54.784 40.532 41.662 47.498 47.262 47.726 47.614 51.624 63.678 48.800
(5.574)*** (7.245)*** (8.031)*** (9.579)*** (11.396)*** (10.662)*** (6.388)*** (9.730)*** (9.166)*** (7.848)*** (14.555)*** (11.661)***
N 197 197 197 368 368 368 290 290 290 162 162 162
R
2 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.009 0.016 0.052
Dependent variable: number of subsequent trials
T
j 0.380 0.383 0.361 -0.050 -0.053 -0.048 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093 0.344 0.344 0.339
(0.241) (0.244) (0.230) (0.158) (0.159) (0.153) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223)
ˆ P
j(X) -0.912 -0.638 -0.382 -0.890 -1.614 -1.740 -1.305 -0.802 -0.625 -1.307 -1.287 -0.786
(0.616) (0.980) (0.853) (0.264)*** (0.955)* (1.066) (0.527)** (2.074) (2.242) (0.826) (2.468) (2.172)
[ ˆ P
j(X)]
2 -0.551 0.979 0.979 0.849 -1.158 -1.107 -0.042 1.408
(1.439) (2.186) (0.990) (0.930) (3.791) (3.817) (3.536) (4.778)
[ ˆ P
j(X)] ∗ T
j -1.420 0.337 -0.363 -1.941
(1.102) (0.624) (1.094) (2.254)
Constant 0.118 0.098 0.022 0.658 0.736 0.775 0.688 0.656 0.634 0.588 0.587 0.497
(0.080) (0.099) (0.049) (0.185)*** (0.240)*** (0.292)*** (0.174)*** (0.225)*** (0.259)** (0.169)*** (0.245)** (0.210)**
N 54 54 54 178 178 178 125 125 125 111 111 111
R
2 0.060 0.060 0.069 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.032 0.032 0.037